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ARMY LIC DOCTRINE: NAVAL ROLES

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The Army and the Air Force Field Manual--FM 100-20/ Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict--seem to indicate that the United States Navy has a very small part to play in a low intensity conflict (LIC). Since the Navy has contributed and will continue to enthusiastically perform intensely at all levels of conflict, it is necessary to integrate Navy missions into Army terminology. This paper provides an orientation for non-Naval officers into the capabilities inherent in naval units, with suggested applications for LIC. Definitions from FM 100-20 suggest many opportunities for the U.S. Navy to contribute to LIC, as past Naval missions indicate.

Basic Missions

This paper will orient non-Navy Officers in uses of the United States Navy's capability as they apply to the Army's Manual of Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20. "Between peace and war is the ambiguous environment of military force which has come to be called low intensity conflict (LIC). . . .military operations which support political, economic and informational action."¹ Since the Navy's performance of all alternate missions depends on the ability to perform its assigned missions, this paper starts with a review of the United States Navy's (USN) roles and missions during general conflict, then will focus on the operational categories of FM 100-20 specifically:

- o Support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies
- o Combatting terrorism
- o Peacekeeping operations
- o Peacetime contingency operations ²

The Navy's contributions to the overall LIC posture, as discussed in this paper, will not include, except in one instance, the immense increase in power and force offered by teaming the Navy with the United States Marine Corps.

Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1 (Rev A.) defines the USN's mission in accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code:

to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of U.S. national interests; in effect, to assure continued maritime superiority for the United States. In its simplest terms, defeating the maritime threat means the destruction of hostile aircraft, surface ships, and submarines which threaten the seaborne forces of the United States and its allies.³

The United States Navy fulfills this objective through two functions: sea control and power projection. The USN achieves sea

control by maintaining control of the surface, subsurface and the air over a designated water mass. Sea control does not indicate that the USN has complete control of all oceans simultaneously; rather it applies, at any given time, to a given area of operations. Power projection is an independent function; it indicates the USN's ability to support land or air campaigns; only after sea control has been assured.

The Navy then derives three main roles to complete these functions and objectives: strategic nuclear deterrence, overseas-deployed forces and security of the sea-lines-of-communication (SLOC).⁴ The ability to perform any alternate missions is based upon two tenants: the role of forward presence and the functional ability to control the SLOC. The Navy maintains, at all times, approximately 30 percent of its deployable forces operationally ready and sailing in the areas of historical crises. An additional 40 percent remains at or near operational readiness; these forces are generally committed to training, usually near home waters defined as within 200 nautical miles of the continental United States. Remaining forces are in reduced operational status at their shore stations to complete basic training and planned maintenance. During heightened tensions or crises, deployable units can increase to about 50 percent. However, without a nationally declared general mobilization this level would be difficult to maintain.⁵

Thus through mobility and forward presence the USN remains ready to carry out its primary mission in critical areas with a minimum response time; to gain control of the seas and project U.S.

power. As each unit arrives prepared to carry out its primary missions attention can be dedicated to carry out alternative tasks.

Naval warfare is conducted in three realms: on the surface, beneath the surface and in the air over the surface. In each area, the Navy seeks to exploit its strengths and minimize its weaknesses. "Naval forces now and in the future must be structured to integrate all three warfare areas in prosecution of their tasks in order to meet a similarly multi-dimensional threat." ⁶

The fundamental tasks are: antiair warfare (AAW); antisubmarine warfare (ASW); anti-surface warfare (ASUW); strike warfare; amphibious warfare; and mine warfare. These tasks normally support the primary missions. Supporting warfare tasks include: special warfare (including special mobile operations, unconventional warfare, coastal and river interdiction, beach and coastal reconnaissance, and certain tactical intelligence operations); ocean surveillance; intelligence; command and control and communications (C3); electronic warfare; and logistics. Following the issuance of NWP.1, the Navy has added another task: strategic lift. This will particularly enhance the U.S. Navy's application to support roles of land tied units throughout the conflict continuum and improve the coordination and cooperation between all the services. Furthermore these supporting tasks advance the fundamental tasks and are the primary source for the alternate missions.

Each naval unit has a place in the supporting warfare tasks. The basic units can be used resourcefully to complete nearly any

assigned mission, across the conflict continuum model. All maritime operations enjoy the obvious advantage that permission is not required to travel to nor maintain a presence near the crisis area. Such presence can be maintained for a short duration (by P-3 Orion patrol aircraft) or for an extended period of time (by ships or battle groups). Hence forward presence gives evidence of the nations' resolve without an actual invasion. The United States has thus sent the Navy to "act at the nation's behest no fewer than fifty times [since 1980]." ⁷ Clearly the United States Navy is not frequently called upon to carry out its primary mission, but it must be ready to control the seas almost anywhere in a short period of time. Given such control, it can then readily project national power. Beyond these primary missions, the Navy can be expected to carry out alternate missions, as anticipated by the Army's FM 100-20. This paper will explore and examine the Navy's capabilities to carry out such missions successfully. It will provide Army Officers with a Navy Officer's perspective on such applications.

Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

FM 100-20 states that "At the direction of the National Command Authority (NCA), US military forces may assist either insurgent movements or host nation governments opposing insurgency." ⁸ Operations can occur in the following eight areas:

- o Intelligence operations
- o Joint-combined exercise
- o Civil-military operations, including civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP)

- o Humanitarian or civic assistance
- o Logistical support operations
- o Population and resources control operations
- o Drug interdiction operations
- o Tactical operations.⁹

Each operation may be supported by naval units--especially if conducted in littoral areas.

Intelligence gathering--whether by surface vessel, aircraft or submarine--is a routine function of any naval unit. The unit always needs to know what's happening in its general operational area. With naval vessels on worldwide deployments, an order from the NCA will almost certainly initiate immediate information collection against any specific target. The level of support would depend upon the type of unit. All units have surface search radars and some level of electronic warfare support measures (ESM) equipment, therefore they can track, monitor and in some cases identify surface targets as they leave the coast. All combat ships have air search radars; thus they can track and correlate the surface and air targets. Each unit can take aboard detachments to collect signal intelligence (SIGINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT). The destroyers U.S.S. Turner Joy (DD 951) and Maddox (DD 731) were performing such missions in August 1964 when they were attacked in the Tonkin Gulf by North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats.¹⁰

The amount and quality of intelligence gathered increases with the size and strength of the unit(s) sent to collect it. A carrier battle group with its aircraft have significant ability to collect over a wide and deep area. The EA-6B, S-3 and E-2 aircraft

have significant abilities in the collection area. The EA-6B (Prowler) is specifically designed for electronic countermeasures (ECM) but to perform the ECM mission it must use ESM and record most of the signals in the ether for further evaluation. The Prowler reportedly receives all signals from 64 megahertz to 10.5 gigahertz.¹¹ The S-3 (Viking) is designed as a patrol aircraft optimized to locate and destroy submarines, however the significant ESM suite, used to detect submarines and surface traffic, can be set to collect information similar to that gathered by the EA-6B (but not with the sophistication of the EA-6B). The E-2 (Hawkeye) is designed as an airborne radar platform and command and control aircraft. The Hawkeye lacks much of the ability of the Prowler and Viking, but it has a significant radio suite which can gather COMINT. The carrier and her aircraft operate synergistically; information gathered from each component can be consolidated to form the larger picture. The carrier's support ships also retain all of their abilities to gather and exploit such information. Single units contain significant intelligence collection capability, which, when combined with the airborne collection in the carrier's information center (CIC) adds to the "big picture." Submarines are able to collect SIGINT and COMINT clandestinely; but since their purpose is to maintain an undetected presence such clandestine collection would probably not be used. Naval patrol aircraft such as the P-3 (Orion) have good capability to collect ESM. The EP-3, a modified Orion, is designed specifically to perform the ESM mission.

Naval collection units can operate with or without the cooperation of the host government by simply abiding by the twelve nautical mile territorial limit. Information can be forwarded as recommended in FM 100-20, sent directly to the military attache in the local embassy or sent back to the NCA for further dissemination. This collection and dissemination of tactical intelligence is the single greatest aid to the host nation that the United States Navy can provide.

Joint-combined exercises have traditionally been a Navy mission. During every deployment the entire crew of a unit looks forward to the training opportunity afforded by joint or combined exercises. The sailors enjoy demonstrating their equipment and performing their missions for people other than their shipmates. The fact that the host nation does not have to support any military personnel on their shores allows the host nation to restrict knowledge of the exercise's existence. Further naval units at sea are nearly inaccessible to terrorists. The ships remain in relatively safe waters off the coast. The exercises can be as simple as radio inter-operability exercises, or they may include formation steaming, joint war-at-sea engagements, or even full scale amphibious assaults.

Civil-military operations (CMO) include "all military efforts to support host nation development, undermine insurgent grievances, gain support for the national government, and attain national objectives without combat." ¹² These operations include but are not limited to:

. . .medical, engineer, communications, transportation and logistical activities undertaken incident to combined exercises. . . .CMO [may] reduce or eliminate the need for combat operations. This minimizes destruction of life and property. However, CMO can play a major role in preparing the area of operations (AO) for combat forces, should they be required. The CMO are developmental, psychological activities which support--

- o CA--military operations embracing relationships between US military forces, civil authorities, and the populace.

- o PSYOP--Development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile foreign groups.¹³

The Navy has the technical expertise to support all of the objectives set forth in the FM 100-20. Medical corpsmen, communication technicians or supply personnel are found in every unit. Engineer support from the Seabees would take slightly longer planning time; but with support from the local Country Team they could be on site in short order. These are well within the stated aim of FM 100-20; aiding the host government. The PSYOP effort would require publication and promulgation of former efforts. A commercial style broadcast radio on one of the ships operating off the coast would ensure the word reaches the people, much as a commercial radio was used in the Panama invasion. This ensures a constant flow of unedited news and information.

Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) "operations provide a mechanism through which US military personnel and assets assist Third World populations. HCA improves the quality of life through rudimentary construction, health care, and sanitation programs."¹⁴ The USN has a long history of HCA activities. When a ship makes a port call, the chaplains always make an effort to help with some local construction or renovation project. The project usually is

done in conjunction with a local church supported orphanage, but not always. Often, if the Chaplin has insufficient funds, the sailors who are performing the work donate the funds to purchase the materials to complete the project. Ships' doctors visit the local hospitals to assess the quality of the care and to offer assistance to the local doctors in treating the indigenous population. Medical Corpsmen can help with the rudimentary health care and hygienics. When a USN ship makes a port call, such HCA activities are routine. When disaster strikes, the Navy responds promptly without burdening the area which is being assisted. "In September 1989, the U.S. Navy ships were promptly on the scene providing electric power, fresh water and volunteer assistance in St. Croix, Puerto Rico, and Charleston, [South Carolina] following Hurricane Hugo. In October, naval forces again provided rescue, vital utilities, medical assistance and volunteer manpower in the aftermath of the Oakland-San Francisco Bay area earthquake." ¹⁵ The ships of the four numbered fleets responded quickly with much needed aid; further, they do not require any support from the damaged infrastructure.

Logistical support operations "support host nation counterinsurgency operations through the security assistance system in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).¹⁶ The naval logistical system would support the host nation in the same manner directed in FM 100-20, except, that the transportation of the goods could be via a logistics ship in the area, when authorized.

Populace and resources control operations (PRC) "measures are the exclusive province of the host nation. In country US forces should avoid assuming PRC missions and should concentrate on providing the security for host nation forces conducting these missions."¹⁷ Naval forces would have little ability to aid in such missions. The Military Police (MP) of the Army have been trained in law enforcement and would be the logical choice for such a mission. The Navy could provide personnel for this mission but they would need to be extensively trained.

Counter-drug operations are usually conducted "in support of on-going Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) programs, under overall control and supervision of the US country team."¹⁸ Tactical counter-drug operations are not normally conducted against insurgents and require focused action usually limited to out-of-country interdiction.¹⁹ The Navy could collect intelligence, much as in the intelligence gathering mission, then notify the host nation and DEA of incoming support for the traffickers or outward-bound drug shipments. Additionally, much of the drug trafficking around the world occurs on interior waterways; the Brown Water Navy, made up of Special Boat Units XI and XXII train indigenous personnel in riverine and harbor patrolling, thus bolstering the host nation's ability for self-security. These boat units are also responsible for some insertions and extractions of the Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams.²⁰ Both are part of the Navy's special operating forces (SOF) and can train host teams in how to perform special missions.

Tactical operations "against insurgents will be an unusual

occurrence. . .Direct actions will be rare, and focused. . ."²¹
Restraints as set forth in FM 100-20 apply to all U.S. Forces. The direct action against an insurgency or counter-insurgency would be counter-productive unless the populace were fully behind the U.S. actions. However, if action is directed, naval forces would be in the position to provide support while offering the least exploitable terrorist target. Strikes from aircraft carriers operating 100 nautical miles off shore, or sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), can make surgical strikes while maintaining the greatest amount of security to the forces executing the strike. Further, carriers provide a convenient return base for strike aircraft; carriers allow them to prepare for follow-on missions, almost indefinitely.

Since the earliest days of this nation, the Navy has stood by to accomplish all assigned missions. Naval forces are often the only forces in the area of the crisis; they need not worry about basing rights nor permission to travel off the coast of any nation. The rights of innocent passage have permitted the Navy to react quickly and firmly in the past. Thus the Navy stands by to perform or assist in any and all missions assigned in any area of the world.

Combatting Terrorism

The Department of Defense (DOD) defines terrorism as:

The unlawful use of--or threatened use of--force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. Religious

and ideological objectives compel political actions, thus it is violence to modify political behavior which is the primary military concern.²²

Terrorists always seek to make a society view itself as undefended, unable to react to random acts of violence. Some terrorists are state-supported, some are not. They pursue five basic terrorist activities:

- o Recognition
- o Coercion
- o Intimidation
- o Provocation
- o Insurgency support²³

FM 100-20 indicates that all of these activities are directed to carry out the objectives of a minority, unable to muster support of the majority. Terrorists seek to influence the majority or ruling government by fear.

Like the Army, the Navy has taken steps to combat terrorism (antiterrorism) by instituting educational programs 1) to increase awareness of the terrorist treat, 2) to increase watch standing professionalism (the act of standing guard) and 3) to bolster physical security programs. This preventative program is designed to limit terrorists' access to exploitable targets. Thus the shore establishment has reduced the vulnerability of installations, units and personnel. A ship at sea has, by its geographical position, a certain measure of invulnerability which allows the Navy to act with a reduced fear of reprisal. For example, in September 1988 the U.S.S. Enterprise had an encounter with the Iranian Navy. In accordance with the antiterrorist campaign, the Enterprise made no international port calls after the battle. She simply returned to

the continental United States, where she and her sailors were under a reduced treat from terrorists. She removed herself from the target list!²⁴

The Navy's efforts in counterterrorism during recent years have been highlighted in the media. But the Navy's most notable contribution has to be the interception of the airliner carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers. F-14s from the U.S.S. Saratoga intercepted the airliner carrying the escaping terrorist in international airspace; they escorted the airliner to a landing at the Naval Air Station in Sigonella, Sicily, where Italian authorities took the terrorists into custody. Even though the terrorist master-mind escaped from Italian custody, this episode demonstrates that naval forces, used decisively with imagination, can play a major role in countering terrorism.

Peacekeeping Operations

"Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain the peace in areas of potential or actual conflict."²⁵ Such operations are conducted with the complete and full consent of the warring factions. Without the agreement of the parties to a cease-fire or to maintain a negotiated truce or peace, peacekeeping activities cannot be carried out.²⁶

Peacekeeping operations may take many forms:

- o Withdrawal and disengagement
- o Cease-fire
- o Prisoner-of-war exchanges
- o Arms control
- o Demilitarization and demobilization²⁷

Peacekeeping forces are always placed between the belligerents. The United States Navy forces would need to be used in a very unique scenario which would require the belligerents to be located along a straight or open-water area. The tense and thankless job which generally requires on-the-ground visibility and decisions may need to be performed by a naval force in the described areas of the world. While these areas are very specific and narrow they would, in all likelihood, prove to be impossible to be performed by ground forces in places like; the Aegean Sea (conflict between Greece and Turkey), Straits of Malacca (conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia) or the Spratly Islands (claimed in-part or wholly by China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam). The disengaged forces would need to transit across the waterways to strike at each other. While the likelihood of conflict between these countries varies, the Navy could be the only service able to enforce the truce or cease fire.

Belligerents separated by a river could require the use of riverine operations to patrol and maintain the peace, another job for the Brown Water Navy. Additionally, the off-shore area could be patrolled as was done off Lebanon. The naval forces standing by to provide logistical support, provide a strike with carrier aircraft or a SLCM capable units, or--most importantly--provide an extraction of the ground tied peacekeeping forces should the need arise. Naval intelligence-gathering to support the peacekeeping forces in an unobtrusive manner could also prevent the disaster of an unexpected attack. Whatever the case, the Navy stands ready to

carry out operations assigned by the war-fighting Commander-in-Chief (CINC).

Peacetime Contingency Operations

Peacetime contingencies are politically sensitive . . . normally characterized by short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war. They are often undertaken in crisis avoidance or crisis management situations requiring the use of military instruments to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives.²⁸

FM 100-20 specifies nine basic contingency operation:

- o Show of force and demonstrations
- o Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)
- o Rescue and recovery operations
- o Strikes and raids
- o Peacemaking
- o Disaster relief
- o Security assistance surges
- o Support to US civil authorities²⁹

"These are characterized as peacetime contingency operations which complement political and informational initiatives."³⁰ While the Navy has a narrow and unique scope of operating in the peacekeeping mission, it excels in the peacetime contingency operation mission. These specific missions call for quick responses and operation from a secure base. Naval forces are surely capable of responding quickly from their forward posture. Intelligence and preparation are of prime importance in all contingencies, especially in missions with the political sensitivity of a peacetime operation. Once again the basic rules outlined in FM 100-20 apply to Navy as well as Army units. For prudent commanders, political sensitivity is always a main consideration. The primary consideration becomes the implication of a mission gone astray. It may create ill will toward the United States far in excess of the good will created by

a mission performed flawlessly. Thus the mission must be well defined with a narrow objective to avoid any political embarrassment.

Show-of-force is a mission designed to demonstrate resolve and bolster friendly governments. The force demonstration is shown by:

- o Forward deployment of military forces
- o Combined training exercises
- o Aircraft and ship visits
- o The introduction or buildup of military forces in a region³¹

As we have seen, naval forces remain in a secure area but make their presence known. Such presence can be indicated in several ways: a message notifying the local flight information region (FIR) that carrier flights will take place, a destroyer sailing 12 miles off the coast, or a P-3 (Orion) patrol craft operating off-shore. By such means, U.S. interests are unmistakably conveyed. A carrier battle group sailing off the coast is undeniable notification that there is interest in the situation unfolding ashore. Further, the carrier battle group provides a near instantaneous buildup of forces in the region. Combined exercises and ship visits have been previously been discussed. All of these shows-of-force have been traditional naval missions.

NEO operations, because of the ships' secure base of operations, are ideally suited for carrier battle groups, battleship surface action groups and amphibious ready groups. As a group, they have the equipment to transport victims safely out of the country. The ships have hospital spaces, food and clothing for

the evacuees and the ability to move them to an area of safety for transportation back to the United States. An amphibious ready group with, their embarked United States Marines, have the facilities and helicopters to move and temporarily hold those rescued from the shore. Further, the Marines have their own way home. Helicopters do not need a large runway from which to operate so they do not offer an easy terrorist target. This was demonstrated during a recent NEO conducted by the Italians in Somalia, the "hardest part of the evacuation of the Italians was getting them through the town from the Italian Embassy to the airport."³² Coordination with the local air traffic control unit is minimal and landing permission is not really required. Finally, the ship is a secure base. Therefore when NEO victims are removed from the country they have escaped imminent danger as well.

From the U.S. Navy's first fight with the Barbary Pirates, to the 1986 Tripoli strikes, the force at hand was the Navy and her aircraft carriers. Also, since the earliest days of naval combat, the sailor/marine team has successfully performed raids to obtain political objectives. Strikes and raids are defined in FM 100-20 as:

attacks by ground, air, and naval forces to damage or destroy high-value targets or to demonstrate the capability to do so. Raids are usually small-scale operations involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, seize an objective, or destroy targets. Strikes and raids end with a planned withdrawal.³³

Naval contributions to both of these missions should be obvious: the strike can be launched from the aircraft carrier, from a SLCM

equipped ship or submarine, or the big guns of the battleships. Such capabilities conform to the FM 100-20 definition. The Navy requires such capabilities to carry out its primary mission. Further, strike delivery violates sovereign territory only during the actual strike.

The Navy provides a particular advantage for raiders: extraction. The strike force can get out of country the way it arrived. Insertion of paratroopers from C-141s does not lend itself to an extraction from an unprepared field. By the same token, operations for a deep raid might not lend itself to naval insertion or extraction. Insertion/extraction of SEAL forces can be by submarine, surface ship, river patrol boat or helicopter. Seal forces are trained to operate in all media (sea, air and land hence the acronym SEAL). They may be deployed "to reconnoiter and attack along coasts in support of naval operations" Further, their targets "range from shore-based weapon systems and beach defenses to harbor installations, merchant ships, and men-of-war in port."³⁴ The SEALs, along with the Special Boat Units, form a readily available raider force.

Peacemaking differs from peacekeeping. Peacemaking is the unilateral imposition of peace, without full agreement of the belligerents.³⁵ The early or initial stages will more closely resemble that of a strike or raid and will probably be just as dangerous. Once again this appears to be very close to a standard naval mission, power projection. Naval forces would use the conventional methods previously described. The use of any force

must--as stated in all cases in FM 100-20--have specific and narrowly defined objectives and rules of engagement (ROE). The peacemaking mission, starting as a strike or a raid, would probably not endear the U.S. Forces to the local population. Thus ROE which minimize damage to the civilian population would be extremely important.³⁶ A complete review of ROE would be mandatory prior to any mission.

Rescue and recovery operations and unconventional warfare (UW) all really fit into the same package. The need for "stealth, surprise, speed, and the threat of overwhelming US forces are some of the means available to overcome opposition."³⁷ SEALs provide all of these attributes. While they are specifically trained in maritime rescue they can be used where ever SOF are used.

The Navy's major support of any UW mission comes in the form of transportation of the SOF personnel--submarines and river patrol boats. As stated in FM 100-20, these missions are supportable from all Navy units. Since Naval ships travel the world, their presence does not attract undue attention. Launching a clandestine mission from a support ship outside the 12 mile territorial limit is probably a preferred start point.

Disaster relief is the "response to a request for immediate help and rehabilitation from foreign government or international agencies."³⁸ The help offered by naval units to U.S. disasters has already been discussed in the section on Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Such relief efforts have been delivered many times and places over the years. Support to US civil authority are

"activities carried out by military forces in support of federal and state officials under, and limited by the Posse Comitatus Act and other laws and regulations."³⁹ The support has been discussed in the section on Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. The Navy has used their hydrofoil patrol craft with Coast Guard (CG) detachments embarked (to comply with Posse Comitatus Act, since men of the CG are law enforcement agents) to interdict drug traffic. Additionally, the Navy has placed combat ships to monitor air traffic between South and North America and report possible drug carrying aircraft to the DEA.

Conclusions

The forces of the United States Navy are ready on arrival to perform all of their wartime missions. Likewise, they are ready to do the alternative missions/tasks assigned by the CINC. Ships and their embarked personnel have responded to crises and contingencies with little to no notice due to their forward presence. Through the entire spectrum of conflict, Naval personnel are standing by to carry out the policies of the United States government and her people. They are usually the first on the scene with any significant force. As has been noted by Robert F. Dunn, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired), in "Always There--Always Ready":

Not only was the [U.S.S.] Independence (Indy) on station near the potential scene of action, but the [U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower] Ike was in the Eastern Mediterranean about to transit the Suez Canal to join Indy . . . Evening news coverage of the carriers' flight decks packed with Tomcats, Hornets, and Intruders was concrete evidence to Saddam Hussein that his forces had already lost control of the air over the battlefield. . . . had Navy carriers not been

early on the scene, Saudi authorities would have had no visible assurances of our commitment upon which to base their request for U.S. land forces; had Navy carriers not been early on the scene, it would have been difficult to provide safe cover to move these land-based forces into Saudi Arabia. . . . six of the nation's 14 deployable aircraft carriers were at sea simultaneously . . . ⁴⁰

This tremendous fire power was ready on arrival. The personnel needed no time to adjust to the climate, they had been at sea for quite a while already. They had operated as an air wing for over six months and were ready to perform any mission assigned. Dunn continues:

New headlines splash across the front pages and anchormen gaze earnestly into the television monitors as they analyze new problems, conflicts, and atrocities, local and international. All the while, the men who man the carriers and the ships that go with them ply distant waters--training, watching, and waiting. Time and again they have preserved the peace merely by their presence. On the rare occasions when this has failed, they have remained--first on the scene--to make the way less painful and risky for follow-on forces. ⁴¹

The one that arrives earliest with the most fire power usually wins and that supports the nations objective in a LIC situation, keep the conflict as limited as possible. The Navy stands-by, ready to help the Army and Air Force with any mission that can be imagined--whether it is help with supplies, personnel or equipment. In all probability when the first aircraft carrying the Air Force and Army personnel land in country, the Navy will be there, providing air and sea cover. As it remains totally prepared to carry out its primary mission, the Navy is as well prepared to pursue many alternate missions.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-20, pp. v-vi (hereafter referred to as "FM 100-20").
2. Ibid., p. 1-10.
3. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Strategic Concepts of the Navy NWP 1 (Rev. A) p. 1-3-1. (hereafter referred to as NWP 1)
4. Ibid., p. 1-3-2
5. Ibid., p. 1-3-3.
6. Ibid., p. 1-4-2.
7. Carlisle A.H. Trost, Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations, The Necessity for Naval Power in the 19 0s Responding to crises-- A Traditional Naval Mission, 30 December 1989, p. 1.
8. FM 100-20, p. 2-1.
9. Ibid., pp. 2-35--2-36.
10. Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet thirteenth edition, pp. 472-473.
11. Ibid., p. 391.
12. FM 100-20, p. 2-37.
13. Ibid., pp. 2-37 and 2-38.
14. Ibid., p. 2-39.
15. Carlisle A.H. Trost, Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations, The Necessity for Naval Power on the 1990s Responding to crises--A Traditional Naval Mission, 30 December 1989, p. 3.
16. FM 100-20, pp. 2-39 and 2-40.
17. Ibid., p. 2-40.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

20. "River Raiders," International Combat Arms; Journal of Defence Technology, May 1989, p. 46.
21. FM 100-20, p. 2-40.
22. Ibid., p. 3-1.
23. Ibid.
24. Carlisle A.H. Trost, Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations, The Necessity for Naval Power in the 1990s Responding to crises--A Traditional Naval Mission, 30 December 1989, p. 2.
25. FM 100-20, p. 4-1.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 5-1.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 5-6.
32. Jane Perlez, "U.S. and Italy Evacuating Foreigners in Somalia," The New York Times, 6 January 1991, p. 3.
33. FM 100-20, p. 5-10.
34. John M. Collins, Green Berets, SEALs & Spetsnaz: U.S. & Soviet Special Military Operations, p. 26.
35. FM 100-20, p. 4-15.
36. Ibid., p. 5-12.
37. Ibid., p. 5-9.
38. Ibid., p. 5-14.
39. Ibid., p. 5-15.
40. Robert F. Dunn, Vice Admiral, "Always There--Always Ready," Proceedings, October 1990, p. 12.
41. Ibid.

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